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  Microélectronique	  de	  Provence	  
AutomaVc	  control	  (centralized	  and	  distributed	  )	  
Middleware	  and	  communicaVon	  	  
CompilaVon	  and	  code	  generaVon	  
Methods	  and	  tools:	  design	  ﬂow	  for	  HW/SW	  integraVon	  
Hardware	  security	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CONTEXT	  
Nowadays,	  embedded	  systems	  have	  increasingly	  become	  criVcal	  part	  of	  our	  
daily	  life	  
1	   Side	  channel	  aaacks	  
Observing	  physical	  quanVVes	  of	  the	  device	  
during	  operaVon	  	  
One	  of	  the	  major	  threats	  against	  these	  systems	  are	  physical	  aMacks	  
There	  are	  two	  main	  categories	  
InjecVng	  a	  fault	  in	  order	  to	  disrupt	  the	  normal	  
funcVoning	  of	  the	  device	  
Fault	  aaacks	  2	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OBJECTIVE	  
Proposing	  a	  tool	  for	  composing	  several	  soeware	  protecVons	  against	  
physical	  aaacks	  
Through	  a	  compilaVon	  toolchain	  
also	  called:	  CompilaVon	  for	  security	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OUTLINE	  
ExisVng	  countermeasures	  against	  physical	  aaacks	  
Concluding	  remarks	  
Our	  approach	  
A	  safari	  inside	  a	  compiler	  
why	  compilaVon	  +	  security	  is	  not	  obvious	  ?	  
Why	  operaVng	  inside	  a	  compiler?	  
First	  results	  
Outlook	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EXISTING	  COUNTERMEASURES	  
Side	  Channel	  AMacks	  
Work	  because	  there	  is	  a	  correlaVon	  between	  the	  operaVons	  being	  
processed	  and	  some	  observable	  physical	  quanVVes	  	  
The	  objecVve	  of	  countermeasures	  is:	   OperaVons	   Physical	  quanVVes	  
Two	  concepts:	  
Soeware	  
InserVon	  of	  dummy	  instrucVons	  
InstrucVons	  shuﬄing	  
Hardware	  
Randomize	  the	  power	  consumpVon	  
Equalize	  the	  power	  consumpVon	  
vm	  =	  v	  ⊕	  m	  
vm	  =	  v	  +	  m	  
vm	  =	  v	  x	  m	  
è	  	  Boolean	  
è	  	  Modular	  addiVon	  
è	  	  Modular	  mulVplicaVon	  
Masking	  1	   Hiding	  2	  
Concealing	  each	  intermediate	  
value	  v	  by	  a	  random	  value	  m	  such	  
as:	  vm	  =	  v	  op	  m	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EXISTING	  COUNTERMEASURES	  
Fault	  AMacks	  
Based	  on	  fault	  models	  where	  an	  aaacker	  can:	  
Skip	  an	  instrucVon	  
Replace	  an	  instrucVon	  with	  another	  one	  
Corrupt	  data	  being	  transferred	  from/to	  memory	  	  
Proposed	  countermeasures	  are:	  
InstrucVons	  redundancy	  	  
Control	  ﬂow	  hardening	  
CRC	  /	  Parity	  Check	  /	  …	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We	  noVce	  two	  approaches	  for	  applying	  countermeasures	  	  








source	  to	  source	  approach	  
Problems:	  
None	  of	  security	  properVes	  applied	  to	  
the	  source	  code	  are	  guaranteed	  aeer	  
the	  compilaVon	  
Except	  if	  all	  the	  compiler	  code	  
opVmizers	  are	  disabled	  	  as	  suggested	  
in	  [Eldib	  et	  al.	  2014]	  
Leads	  to	  very	  high	  execuVon	  overheads:	  
è	  +	  400%	  in	  [Lalande	  et	  al.	  	  2014]	  
At	  the	  source	  code	  level	  1	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Lack	  of	  visibility	  program	  context	  
Oeen	  ad-­‐hoc	  [Barenghi et al., 2010] 
è	  Overheads	  ++	  
Assembly	  approach	  
2	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  [Regazzoni	  et	  al.	  2008]	  and	  [Luo	  et	  al.	  2014]	  have	  shown	  that	  a	  code	  protected	  against	  
Fault	  aaacks	  may	  increase	  the	  power	  leakage	  
è	  and	  then	  become	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  power	  analysis	  aaacks	  
How	  to	  take	  into	  account	  several	  threats	  inside	  a	  countermeasure	  ?	  
A	  countermeasure	  is	  designed	  to	  protect	  against	  one	  single	  aaack	  
Cliquez	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  le	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  du	  (tre	  























OUR	  APPROACH	  	  
Com osiVon	  of	  	  several	  protecVons	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OUTLINE	  
ExisVng	  countermeasures	  against	  physical	  aaacks	  
Concluding	  remarks	  
Our	  approach	  
A	  safari	  inside	  a	  compiler	  
why	  compilaVon	  +	  security	  is	  not	  obvious	  ?	  
Why	  operaVng	  inside	  a	  compiler?	  
First	  results	  
Outlook	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A	  SAFARI	  INSIDE	  A	  COMPILER	  
What	  is	  a	  compiler	  ?	  
Source	  code	   Machine	  code	  
Compiler	  
The	  source	  code	  passes	  through	  several	  transformaVons	  and	  representaVon	  	  
before	  the	  Machine	  code	  	  
Each	  one	  is	  suitable	  for	  some	  kind	  of	  tasks	  of	  the	  compiler	  
Modern	  compilers	  are	  structured	  in	  3	  phases:	  
Front	  end	   Middle	  end	   Back	  end	  
Source	  code	  	   Machine	  code	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Reads	  the	  source	  code	  
and	  splits	  it	  into	  a	  list	  of	  
tokens	  	  e.g.:	  	  
if	   (	   x	   >	   0	   )	   {	  
Return	   a	   +	   b	   ;	   }	  
Take	  the	  list	  of	  tokens,	  	  
built	  the	  AST	  	  è	  check	  
the	  validity	  of	  the	  syntax	  	  
if	  
>	  
x	   0	  
ret	  
+	  
a	   b	  
Source	  code	  
If (x > 0){ 
    return a+b; 
} 
… 
%cmp = icmp sgt i32 %x, 0 
br i1 %cmp, label %if.then, … 
 
%if.then: 
    %add = add nsw i32 %a, %b 
    store i32 %add, i32* %retval 
    br label %return 
… 
Simpliﬁed	  LLVM-­‐IR	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A	  SAFARI	  INSIDE	  A	  COMPILER	  
Middle	  end	  
Takes	  as	  input	  the	  Intermediate	  representaVon	  	  
The	  IR	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  language	  and	  target	  independent	  
Front	  end	   Middle	  end	   Back	  end	  
Language	  dependent	   Target	  dependent	  
C,	  	  C++,	  	  Java,	  	  Fortran,	  …	   x86,	  ARM,	  MIPS,	  SPARC	  …	  
A	  countermeasure	  applied	  at	  the	  middle	  end	  remain	  valid	  for	  all	  languages	  
and	  targets	  supported	  by	  the	  compiler	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A	  SAFARI	  INSIDE	  A	  COMPILER	  
Middle	  end	  
The	  majority	  of	  code	  opVmizer	  are	  applied	  at	  middle	  end	  	  
Among	  them	  we	  have:	  
•  Global	  Value	  Numbering	  (GVN)	   Remove	  all	  redundant	  instrucVons	  
int x = 0; 
int y = f(x); 
for(int i=1; i<= 100; i++) 
    if(i > 0) 
 x = x + 1; 
    else 
 x = x – 1; 
y = f(x) 
•  Dead	  Code	  EliminaVon	  (DCE)	  
•  Dead	  Store	  EliminaVon	  (DSE)	  
Remove	  all	  unreachable	  instrucVons	  
Remove	  memory	  wriVngs	  that	  are	  never	  read	  
int x = 0; 
int y = f(x); 
for(int i=1; i<= 100; i++) 
    x = x + 1; 
y = f(x) 
int x = 0; 
int y = f(x); 
x = 100; 
y = f(x) 
int y = f(0); 
int x = 100; 
y = f(x) 
int y = f(100); 
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A	  SAFARI	  INSIDE	  A	  COMPILER	  
Middle	  end	  
•  Loop	  Invariant	  Code	  MoVon	  (LICM)	  
•  LOOP-­‐UNROLLING	  /	  LOOP	  UNSWITCH	  	  
bool flag; 
for(int i=7; i*i< 1000; i++){ 
    flag = verdict(1); 
    if(flag == true) 
 foo(); 




for(int i=0; i<25; i++){ 
    flag = verdict(1); 
    if(flag == true) 
 foo(); 
    else 
 bar(); 
} 
31*31	  =	  961	  
32*32	  =	  1024	  
è  i	  =	  [7-­‐32]	  è	  [0-­‐25]	  
bool flag = verdict(1); 
for(int i=0; i<25; i++){ 
    if(flag == true) 
 foo(); 
    else 
 bar(); 
} 
bool flag = verdict(1); 
if(flag == true) 
   for(int i=0; i<25; i++) 
      foo(); 
else 
   for(int i=0; i<25; i++) 
      bar(); 
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A	  SAFARI	  INSIDE	  A	  COMPILER	  
Back	  end	  
Takes	  the	  IR	  as	  input	  	  
InstrucVons	  selecVons	  
InstrucVon	  scheduling	  	  
Register	  allocaVon	  
Machine	  code	  emission	  
Convert	  the	  IR	  to	  a	  representaVon	  close	  to	  the	  
target	  architecture	  	  
Rearrange	  instrucVons	  to	  obtain	  the	  best	  
execuVon	  order	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  stalls	  inside	  the	  
pipeline	  
Find	  the	  best	  way	  to	  assign	  physical	  registers	  to	  
variables	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  register	  pressure	  and	  
avoid	  memory	  spills	  	  
Emit	  executable	  code	  that	  is	  target-­‐speciﬁc	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COMPILATION	  VS.	  SECURITY	  
GeneraVon	  of	  	  executable	  code	  for	  a	  
target	  architecture	  
COMP I L A T I ON 	   SECUR I T Y 	  




Resistance	  against	  aaacks	  
Adding	  instrucVon	  redundancy	  
InserVon	  of	  dummy	  instrucVons	  
Random	  scheduling	  	  (shuﬄing)	  
Masking	  intermediate	  values	  
Removing	  any	  instrucVon	  redundancy	  
Dead	  code/store	  eliminaVon	  	  
Smart	  scheduling	  
Simplifying	  and	  combining	  operaVon	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WHY	  OPERATING	  INSIDE	  A	  COMPILER?	  
Possibility	  to	  reduce	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  security	  
We	  can	  decide	  where	  and	  when	  to	  apply	  security	  	  
We	  can	  ensure	  that	  the	  security	  won’t	  be	  removed	  by	  the	  compiler	  
We	  can	  take	  advantage	  of	  code	  opVmizaVon	  
We	  have	  a	  complete	  view	  on	  the	  program	  being	  compiled	  1	  
We	  have	  control	  over	  code	  opVmizers	  2	  
We	  can	  scale	  the	  security	  level	  relaVve	  to	  opVmizaVon	  level	  3	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FIRST	  RESULTS	  
With	  a	  very	  opVmal	  overhead	  thanks	  to	  our	  hacked	  register	  allocator	  1	  
WHY?	  
With	  an	  Assembly	  approach,	  when	  comes	  to	  duplicate	  an	  instrucVon	  like:	   add R0, R0, R1 
Just	  doing	  	  	  
add R0, R0, R1 
add R0, R0, R1 
is	  invalid	  because	  R0	  is	  both	  source	  and	  desVnaVon	  
An	  extra	  available	  register	  is	  needed	  to	  save	  R0:	  
mov R2, R0 
add R0, R2, R1 
How	  to	  ﬁnd	  an	  extra	  available	  register?	  
Instruc(on	  duplica(on	  (ID)	  inside	  the	  compiler	  
you	  are	  designing	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  countermeasure	  	  
and	  you	  know	  how	  many	  registers	  are	  
available	  [Barenghi	  et	  al.,	  2010]	  
	  
1	  
you	  parse	  your	  assembly	  code	  (not	  easy)	  2	  
push R2 
mov R2, R0 
mov R2, R0 
add R0, R2, R1 
add R0, R2, R1 
pop R2 
mov R2, R0 
mov R2, R0 
add R0, R2, R1 
add R0, R2, R1 
3	   Save	  an	  restore	  	  
push R2 
mov R2, R0 
add R0, R2, R1 
pop R2 
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FIRST	  RESULTS	  
With	  a	  very	  opVmal	  overhead	  thanks	  to	  our	  hacked	  register	  allocator	  (RA)	  1	  
Instruc(on	  duplica(on	  (ID)	  inside	  the	  compiler	  
opcode Rdst, Rsrc1, Rsrc2 (Rdst != Rsrc1) and (Rdst != Rsrc2) 
We	  modiﬁed	  our	  RA	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  desVnaVon	  register	  is	  always	  
diﬀerent	  to	  source	  registers:	  
Instead	  of	  generaVng:	  
THAT’S	  WHY	  
add R0, R0, R1 
We	  automaVcally	  generate:	   add R0, R1, R2 
and	  duplicaVng	  such	  an	  instrucVon	  is	  straighorward	  
add R0, R1, R2 
add R0, R1, R2 
with	  a	  reduced	  overhead	  compared	  to:	  
mov R2, R0 
mov R2, R0 
add R0, R2, R1 
add R0, R2, R1 
X	  4	  
push R2 
mov R2, R0 
mov R2, R0 
add R0, R2, R1 
add R0, R2, R1 
pop R2 
and	   X	  6	  
X	  2	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FIRST	  RESULTS	  
With	  a	  very	  opVmal	  overhead	  thanks	  to	  our	  hacked	  register	  allocator	  (RA)	  1	  
Instruc(on	  duplica(on	  (ID)	  inside	  the	  compiler	  
Our	  duplicaVon	  process	  is	  done	  before	  the	  instrucVon	  scheduling	  2	  
The	  compiler	  will	  rearrange	  the	  instrucVons	  in	  order	  to	  ﬁnd	  the	  best	  execuVon	  order	  
As	  a	  consequence:	  
	  è	  duplicated	  instrucVons	  may	  not	  necessary	  be	  glued	  
add R0, R1, R2 
store R9, r5 
add R0, R1, R2 
store R9, r5 
add R0, R1, R2 
	  è	  improve	  the	  execuVon	  speed	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OUTLOOK	  
Our	  objecVve	  is	  not	  to	  produce	  new	  unknown	  countermeasure	  
The	  next	  step	  is	  to	  implement	  power	  analysis	  countermeasures	  in	  
our	  compiler	  	  
BUT	  
Finding	  a	  way	  to	  combine	  them	  in	  a	  single	  tool,	  without	  marginalizing	  
the	  execuVon	  performance	  	  
And	  then	  implemenVng	  a	  uniﬁed	  countermeasure	  model	  	  
Proving	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  model	  
Centre	  de	  Grenoble	  
17	  rue	  des	  Martyrs	  
38054	  Grenoble	  Cedex	  
Centre	  de	  Saclay	  
	  Nano-­‐Innov	  PC	  	  172	  
91191	  Gif	  sur	  Yveae	  Cedex	  
Thank	  you	  for	  your	  aaenVon	  
hap://thiernobarry.fr	  
